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Recent studies demonstrated that the sequential induction of contrasting negative
and positive emotions can be used as a social influence technique. The original
field experiments found that whenever a sudden change in the emotional dynamic
occurs – from negative to positive or vice versa – an increase in compliant behavior
and an impairment in cognitive functioning can be observed. The goal of the present
experiments was a conceptual replication and extension of the results in a more
controlled and counterbalanced fashion. To this aim a novel emotion induction technique
was created using an outcome related expectancy violation to induce and change
emotions. In a first experiment, the influence of contrasting emotions (vs. only one
emotion) on compliance, message processing and information recall was assessed
among 80 undergraduate students. We were able to show that a positive, then negative
experience, and vice versa, led to losses in processing efficacy, not only leaving
individuals momentarily vulnerable to social influence attempts, but also impairing
information recall. We replicated this pattern of findings in a second experiment (N = 41).
The implications of this innovative induction technique and its findings for theory and
future research on the emerging field on contrasting emotions as social-influence
techniques are discussed.
Keywords: emotional seesaw phenomenon, contrasting emotions, social influence technique, compliance,
cognitive processing
INTRODUCTION
How does experiencing a negative event that then turns out to be positive, or experiencing a positive
event that then turns out as negative, influence cognitive processing and compliant behavior? The
influence of emotions on human behavior (Baumeister et al., 2007), decision making (Lerner et al.,
2015), and cognitive processing (Mueller, 2011) has been extensively studied. This influence though
was predominantly examined using a one-directional and non-repetitive approach, testing how an
individual feels or reacts to only one kind of emotional stimulus, either a positive or a negative
one (Hareli and Rafaeli, 2008). However, everyone who just managed to avoid a car accident (fear-
then-relief), or picked up a potential treasure from the street that turned out to be trash (happiness-
then-disappointment) can relate to the idea that sequential contrasting emotions can affect us on
a day-to-day basis. Yet these situations and their consequences are poorly captured by existing
research on emotion.
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There is reason to believe that the sequential experience of
positive and negative emotions makes people more susceptible
to persuasive attempts than the experience of either type of
emotion alone – an idea originally proposed by Dolinski and
Nawrat (1998). These authors showed that contrasting emotions
impair some aspects of cognitive processing and can be used
as tools of social influence. The researchers called this new
social influence technique the emotional seesaw phenomenon
(ESP)1, thus extending what they previously referred to as the
fear-then-relief technique (e.g., Dolinski and Nawrat, 1998).
The present experiments provide an overarching conceptual
replication and develop a new properly counterbalanced method
of emotion induction suitable for laboratory testing. Our goal is
to validate previous findings, to extend them by examining the
ESP’s influence on information recall, and to provide an easy
to implement method to stimulate and guide future research on
contrasting emotions as social influence technique.
In everyday life, humans are faced with situations where they
are talked into subscribing, acquiring, signing, and donating –
behaviors that often are not compatible with their current beliefs
nor needs. These situations are designed to persuade people to
act without the hard work of attitude change. Although these
techniques differ in many aspects from each other, many of
them follow a certain procedural script (Cialdini and Goldstein,
2004). Most of the well-known techniques are based on a scripted
procedure composed of sequential requests: The requesting itself
proceeds in stages, each of which establishes the foundation for
further changes in behavior. For example, the foot-in-the-door
technique (Freedman and Fraser, 1966) starts with a small request
only to gain compliance with a larger target request afterward.
Meta-analyses for such techniques suggest that the probability of
compliance raises significantly compared to a situation where the
target request is asked straight away (Burger, 1999; Pascual and
Guéguen, 2005).
A fairly new social influence technique that does not share the
characteristics of those mentioned above is the ESP. It aims at
achieving compliance without following a sequential requesting
structure. Inspired by the bad-cop–good-cop procedure - a well-
known police interrogation technique – Dolinski and Nawrat
(1998) investigated the influence of sequential opposing emotions
on compliance and cognitive performance. The experiments
entailed a mix of emotions in order to wield influence over
a target person. In some studies, the researchers implemented
a shift from negative to positive: They scared jaywalkers who
crossed a street illegally via a police whistle, or frightened
parking violators with parking tickets that turned out to be
advertisements (Dolinski and Nawrat, 1998). In other studies,
the emotional shift was from positive to negative, for instance,
finding a banknote that turned out to be an advertisement, or
informing people that due to an overpayment they would be
reimbursed with a considerable sum of money and later claiming
that this was a computer mistake (Nawrat and Dolinski, 2007).
Several interesting findings emerged from these experiments.
1For the sake of clarity, throughout the paper we use the terms emotional seesaw
and contrasting emotions interchangeably, referring to experiencing a positive then
negative emotional stimulus or vice versa.
Among the most consistent results was that people undergoing a
sequence of contrasting emotions (irrespective of the direction)
showed higher susceptibility to compliant behavior. The
sequence promoted not only non-consequential compliance to
a senseless plea, such as switching the telephone receiver from
one ear to the other in order to check the permeability of
the line; it was shown as well for consequential compliance
such as money donation, time spent watching a stranger’s
luggage, or voluntary charity work (Dolinski and Nawrat,
1998; Nawrat and Dolinski, 2007). Some evidence also suggests
that contrasting emotions lead to impairments in cognitive
processing efficiency. Participants subjected to an emotional
seesaw mindlessly accepted dubious requests for money donation
without raising any concerns in response (Dolinski and Nawrat,
1998). This impaired cognitive appraisal of the request content
was attributed to a mindless state of mind. Mindlessness, a
shallow processing of information, was being hypothesized to be
the reason for elevated compliance. Two additional experiments
confirmed the inhibitory tendencies of contrasting emotions on
cognitive processing. In the experiments, participants exhibited
impairments in both simple (emotional perception) and more
complex cognitive tasks (arithmetical operations) (Dolinski et al.,
2002).
In essence, it can be extrapolated from the research that the
sudden shift of emotions, be it from positive to negative or vice
versa, induces mindlessness and in turn promotes behavioral
compliance. Yet critical questions regarding causality remained
empirically untouched. Our first goal was to investigate the
independence of the findings from the procedures used and
from the context by eliminating methodological ambiguities
prior studies were unable to control. Our experiment was
designed to answer the question whether the display of
contrasting emotions is more powerful for impairing cognitive
processing and generating compliance than the display of
either only negative or only positive emotions. We assert
that a properly counterbalanced conceptual replication in a
controlled environment could not only validate the existing
findings, but also possibly provide insight into the mechanism
and further consequences. For this reason, apart from testing
existing hypotheses, we also examine the influence of contrasting
emotions on a different aspect of cognitive processing, namely
information recall. Because prior research suggests a close
connection between contrasting emotions and an inhibition in
processing efficiency, we propose that memory processing should
be inhibited as well.
The Current Experiments
The current study involves an innovative way of inducing
contrasting emotions in a laboratory setting. The shift from
positive to negative and vice versa is induced in a parallel
fashion. Because previous studies have already established that
consequential compliance is increased after the ESP, we focus
on a compliance scenario that does not depend on material
resources, namely signing a petition. Because signing a petition
should – given mindful processing – depend on ideology and
content, we use a senseless request. Thus, in the presence of
message elaboration, rejection should be the default option. In
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this regard, our approach is superior to many other compliance
studies by eliminating possible compliance influencing factors
such as personal resources (e.g., time or money) or ideology (e.g.,
attitude toward the request). This setup allows us to measure
not only compliance rates but also – based on participants’
concerns or questions regarding the senseless petition – the
presence or absence of message elaboration (see Dolinski
and Nawrat, 1998). However, analyzing only overt behavioral
measures (questions and signature), does not necessarily provide
insight into processing efficiency. It could be the case that
a person perfectly understood the request but was too shy
to veto (no processing inhibition). This is why the main
difference between the so far known consequences of contrasting
emotions and our work is that, apart from measuring exclusively
overt behavioral responses, we introduced analyses of memory,
assessing participants’ recall of petition associated information.
We tested whether people after an emotional seesaw,
compared to a control condition, showed impaired cognitive
functioning, measured as message processing (H1), a greater
willingness to comply (H2), and a decline in information recall
(H3). Those findings should be independent of the direction of
the emotional shift. Two experiments were designed to test these
theoretical assumptions. The goal of the first experiment was to
conceptually replicate and to extend previous findings using a
new ESP induction technique based on an expectancy violating
structure. The goal of the second experiment was to replicate
the findings of Experiment 1 and to validate the used emotion
induction procedure.
ETHICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL
CONSIDERATIONS
Both studies were approved by the institutional review board
of the Max Planck Institute of Economics. In accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki, all participants provided written
consent before completing the experiment. Termination of
data collection was decided in advance, based on a fixed N.
Practical considerations determined the sample size due to
the logistic effort required (at least three experimenters, two
experimental rooms, and 25 min per participant). We strived
for the recommended minimum of 20 observations per cell as
proposed by Simmons et al. (2011). The paper is written under
a full disclosure policy, all experimental treatments, collected
variables along with undertaken analyses are mentioned in the
text or corresponding footnotes.
EXPERIMENT 1
Participants
Eighty visitors of the university library in a large town in
Germany voluntarily participated in the experiment. They were
reimbursed with €1 and had the possibility to win €2.50, as
described below. One participant was excluded from analyses
because he had been overlooked by the petitionist (N = 79;
48 female, 31 male; Mage = 24.29, SDage = 3.97). A post hoc
power analyses for Chi-Square-Tests showed that this sample size
allows detecting medium sized effects (w= 0.30), given α= 0.05,
with statistical power of 1 – β = 0.76 (Faul et al., 2007). All
participants were tested individually according to a prearranged
random order.
Materials and Procedure
Stage 1
Participants were welcomed in Experimental Room 1 (ER1).
After providing informed consent, they were asked to take part
in a common knowledge quiz in ER2. There they were provided
with the following information: “You will take part in a computer-
based common knowledge quiz, consisting of 5 multiple-choice
questions. You can win up to €2.50. Additionally you will receive a
fixed participation fee of €1. After you finish the quiz please return
immediately to ER1 in order to answer a questionnaire and to
receive your payment. You can start the quiz now.” Experimenters
were instructed to not reveal any additional information and to
leave the experimental room after the onset of the quiz to avoid
questions concerning the manipulation.
Stage 2
In ER2, participants were randomly assigned to one of
two groups: the experimental condition where an emotional
seesaw was implemented (n = 40) vs. the control condition
without emotional seesaw (n = 39). As a control factor, we
included whether final emotional state was positive or negative.
Consequently, half of the participants in each condition had
a negative final emotional state and half of the participants
a positive one. Emotions were manipulated by the difficulty
of the questions (positive mood induction through easy
questions, negative mood induction through difficult questions).
Emotions were intensified by immediate feedback after each
response. A payout scheme was displayed on the computer
screen at the end of the game. In the control group, the
proposed payout was congruent with common expectations:
For every correct answer participants received €0.50, for every
incorrect 0€. The emotional seesaw in the experimental group
was induced by an expectancy-incongruent payout scheme.
The payout table was reversed: Participants received 0€ for
every correct answer and €0.50 for every incorrect one. As
common knowledge suggests a positive monetary outcome
for correct answers, the violation of those expectancies was
supposed to elicit an emotional seesaw (i.e., in the case of
many correct answers, the high expectation of winning much
was disappointed; in the case of few correct answers, the
low expectation of winning little surprisingly turned out as
incorrect)2. The frequency of this belief and the difficulty of
the questions were pretested and confirmed in a pilot study
(N = 15).
Stage 3
On their way back to ER1, one of two female petitionists
blind to the experimental condition approached participants
2Participants were only included in analyses if they arrived at at least three (out of
five) correct answers in the easy questions condition, or respectively, three wrong
answers in the difficult questions condition. All participants reached this threshold.
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with a request to sign a petition. After introducing herself as
a student of the university, the petitionist asked participants
to sign a petition demanding that every student should have
the right to choose which public transportation to use to
go to university. This is a nonsense petition because people
can choose which means of transportation they want to take.
Participants’ reactions constituted DV1, Message Processing, and
DV2, Compliance. Petitionists were trained beforehand to display
always the same behavior and use certain coding rules with three
instructed dummy participants displaying different behaviors.
Both petitionists were of the same gender, age, had comparable
physical features (attractiveness, hair color, and length), and wore
similar outfits.
Message processing
To test the assumption that mindless participants are less likely
to ask questions or raise concerns about the nonsense request,
the petitionist noted explicit questions and comments. Questions
or concerns raised in response to the nonsense request were
treated as indicators of conscious message elaboration. The
variable was therefore coded dichotomously (message processing
present vs. absent). Petitionists were instructed to classify
message elaboration as present when participants indicated a
basic understanding of the message (e.g., questions: “Aren’t we
already allowed to do so?”; “Could you elaborate on that?”;
or concerns: “We are already allowed to choose!”; “This is
stupid!”). In order to circumvent possible misunderstandings due
to acoustic interferences petitionists were instructed to repeat
the request in the exact same manner when asked “what” or
“sorry.”
Compliance
To test the hypothesis that people after an emotional seesaw
reveal compliant behavior, participants were asked to sign a
nonsense petition. The signature was treated as compliant
behavior3.
Stage 4
Back in ER1 participants were asked to complete two
questionnaires, one concerning the petition and the petitionist
(DV3: Information Recall) and a second one concerning
demographic (age, gender, and education) and control questions.
To mitigate demand effects control questions included: “What
was the purpose of the petition?”; “Did you notice that the petition
was part of the study?”; “What did you think this study was
about?”4
Information Recall
In order to test whether people in the seesaw group would
remember less information about the confederate and the
3Furthermore, petitionists took notes whether participants stopped when they were
approached, whether they listened till the end of the message, and whether they
verbally agreed to sign the petition. The first behavioral steps were also treated as
possible signs of compliant behavior and analyzed if no significant difference in the
number of signatures on the petition was found.
4No participant correctly identified the research question or experimental
hypothesis. Only 22% of participants reported to suspect ex post that the petition
was part of the experiment. Reported suspicion was not related to any of the
dependent measures.
petition than people in the control group, a 9-item multiple-
choice questionnaire was used, including the option “I don’t
know” with each question. Example questions and response
options are: (1) Was the person who approached you: (a) male, (b)
female; (2) The color of his/her hair was (a) black, (b) brunette, (c)
blond, (d) red. In order to account for guessing, an information
recall index was computed based on the two-high-threshold
model of recognition memory (Snodgrass and Corwin, 1988).
The discrimination index (Pr) was computed by subtracting
the number of wrong responses from the number of correct
ones. After questionnaire completion, participants received their
reimbursement, were thanked and debriefed.
Design
The design was a between-subjects one-factor design with
two levels (experimental condition: one emotion, n = 39, vs.
emotional seesaw, n = 40). [Final] emotional state was included
as a control factor. Dependent measures were (a) message
processing, (b) compliance, and (c) information recall. To each
affirmative behavior [(a) asking questions, (b) signing petition,
(c) correct answer], we assigned “1” and “0” for not displaying
this behavior.
Results
Throughout the present paper, significance tests were conducted
with α ≤ 0.05. Although all our hypotheses imply directional
predictions, we report the focused one-tailed test only if the two-
tailed probability is non-significant (cf. Meiser, 2011). Following
established practice in social influence research (e.g., Dolinski and
Nawrat, 1998; Goldstein et al., 2011) we applied Chi-Square tests
to analyze proportions of explicitly stated comments in response
to the nonsense petition, as well as the amount of collected
signatures (see Figure 1A). To prevent the overestimation of
statistical significance for small sample sizes we report the Yates
corrected Chi-Square results. Separate results for each condition
are presented in Table 1. Preliminary analyses including the
factors age, gender, and education, as well as identity of the
petitionist, yielded no statistically significant main effects or
interactions. These data are therefore not presented.
In line with Hypothesis 1, participants in the experimental
group (emotional seesaw) tended to be less likely to comment on
the petition than participants in the control group (one emotion),
χ2(1, n = 79) = 2.99, pone tailed = 0.04, phi = −0.22. Participants
undergoing a seesaw were also more willing to sign the senseless
petition than participants who experienced only one emotion,
χ2(1, n= 79)= 4.59, p< 0.05, phi= 0.27, confirming Hypothesis
2. Furthermore a univariate ANOVA revealed that as predicted
(H3) experiencing an emotional seesaw resulted in impaired
information recall, F(1,77) = 17.69, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.19: As
seen in Figure 1B people in the experimental group (M = 3.98;
SD = 2.14) remembered less information about the petition and
the petitionist than participants in the control group (M = 5.82;
SD= 3.98).
To rule out that final emotional state affected results we
performed a 2 × 2 between-groups MANOVA (experimental
condition: seesaw vs. one emotion; final emotional state: positive
vs. negative), using as DVs message processing, compliance,
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Percentage of people who asked questions, or raised concerns in response to the petition (Message Processing), and signed the petition
(Compliance). (B) Number of correctly recalled details concerning the petition and the petitionist minus false alarms (Information Recall).
TABLE 1 | Frequency of Vocalized Doubts, Signatures on the Petition, and
Information Remembered by Participants, Separately for each Condition.
Message
Processing
Compliance Information
Recall
% n/N % n/N M SD
Positive 65 (13/20) 35 (7/20) 6.35 1.66
Negative 74 (14/19) 53 (10/19) 5.26 1.66
Positive Seesaw 57 (12/21) 67 (14/21) 3.05 2.09
Negative Seesaw 37 (7/19) 74 (14/19) 5.00 1.73
Higher values indicate higher propensity to comment on the petition (Message
Processing), sign the petition (Compliance) and to remember information
concerning the petition (Information Recall). N, number of participants per
condition; M, mean; SD, standard deviation.
and information recall. As expected, final emotional state had
no influence on the dependent variables, Pillai’s Trace = 0.03,
F(3,73) < 1, p = 0.52. Likewise, there was no significant
interaction between experimental group and final emotional
state, Pillai’s Trace = 0.09, F(3,73) = 2.34, p = 0.08, which
means that neither the direction of the emotional shift in the
experimental group, nor the valence of the induced emotion
in the control group significantly affected results. As reported
above, the influence of experimental condition on the combined
dependent variables was significant, Pillai’s Trace = 0.26,
F(3,73) = 8.73, p < 0.001. As the control questions revealed, in
hindsight, 85% of participants in the one emotion and 75% in
the emotional seesaw groups correctly recalled the purpose of the
petition; the difference was not significant, χ2(1, n = 79) = 1.13,
p= 0.57, phi= 0.12.
Discussion
Regarding the frequency of compliance with a request, as well
as the verbal expression of doubts, the results support earlier
findings. Participants displayed impaired message processing,
which resulted in higher compliance to sign even a nonsense
petition in response to a seesaw manipulation as opposed to the
control group were only one emotion was induced (Dolinski and
Nawrat, 1998). Additionally, this experiment makes two original
contributions: First, it establishes a procedure to investigate
the ESP in the laboratory. Second, it is the first to reveal a
deteriorating impact of the ESP on information recall.
EXPERIMENT 2
The second experiment was conducted to replicate the findings
of Experiment 1. To test additionally whether our manipulation
elicits the intended emotions, a manipulation check was included
in the experimental script. Therefore a measure of participants’
current emotional state was introduced before and after the
manipulation. We expected that the final emotional state in the
one-emotion, positive group to be more positive than that in
the one-emotion, negative group, with the emotional seesaw
groups in between. As in Experiment 1, we further hypothesized
that impaired message processing, elevated compliance, and less
information recall should be observed in the experimental group
(H1-3).
Participants and Design
A sample of 41 students of a large German university were asked
to participate in a common knowledge quiz experiment. One
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participant from the emotional seesaw group was overlooked
by the petitionist and therefore removed from analysis. The
one factor (experimental condition: emotional seesaw; n = 19
vs. one emotion, n = 21) between-subjects design included
one additional control factor (final emotional state: positive vs.
negative) that should not affect results. There were 19 male and 21
female participants (N = 40; Mage = 22.33, SDage = 2.40). Again,
the incentive was the chance to win €2.50 and €1 participation
endowment.
Materials and Procedure
Briefly, in ER1, participants’ initial emotional state (T1) was
measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = very good;
5 = very bad). Subsequently they were randomly assigned to
the computer-based condition (answer five questions: easy vs.
difficult; expectancy violating vs. expectancy congruent payout
scheme) and requested to immediately depart to the second
experimental room after answering the quiz. On their way
to ER2 they were approached by a male petitionist. In ER2,
participants’ current emotional state T25 and informational recall
were assessed using questionnaires. Because the male petitionist
possessed many distinctive features (e.g., glasses) the information
recall questionnaire (DV3) was extended from 9 to 14 items. All
other details of the procedure were identical to Experiment 1.
Results
Replicating the results of Experiment 1, fewer participants in the
experimental group asked questions concerning the petition than
in the control group [31.6% (6 out of 19) vs. 61.9 % (13 out of 21)],
χ2(1, n= 40)= 2.56, pone tailed = 0.05, phi=−0.30. Furthermore
once again participants who experienced an emotional seesaw
more often signed the nonsense petition [52.6% (10 out of 19)
vs. 19% (4 out of 21)], χ2(1, n = 40) = 3.58, pone tailed = 0.03,
phi = 0.35, and remembered less information about its content
and the appearance of the petitionist (M = 5.63, SD = 2.45 vs.
M = 8.76, SD = 4.78), F(1,38) = 6.56, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.15, than
participants of the control group.
To ensure that the manipulation evoked the intended
emotions, a repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to assess
the impact of the final emotional state (positive vs. negative)
and the experimental group (one emotion vs. emotional seesaw)
on participants’ current emotional state prior to (T1) and
following the intervention (T2). The manipulation check revealed
a significant final emotional state × experimental group × time
interaction, F(1,33) = 4.80; p < 0.05, η2p = 0.13. Significant
changes in emotional state were reported only in the one-emotion
group (positive and negative), interaction: F(1,17) = 10.93;
p < 0.01, η2p = 0.39. After answering the easy questions
participants’ emotional state improved from T1 (M = 2.09;
SD = 0.70) to T2 (M = 1.53; SD = 0.45), but for participants
who were asked to answer difficult questions, the emotional state
deteriorated from T1 (M = 2.38, SD = 0.52) to T2 (M = 3.08,
5Participants’ current emotional state (T2) could not be assessed immediately after
the ESP induction because asking cognitively demanding questions after the ESP
prompts a shift back to mindfulness, mitigating effects on behavior (Dolinski et al.,
2002).
SD = 0.68). As expected no emotional changes from T1 to T2
were found in the seesaw groups, all Fs ≤ 1. This means that
the manipulation evoked the intended emotions in the control
groups, but as intended, in the experimental groups, the final
emotional state after the emotional seesaw was similar to that at
the beginning of the experiment. The elicited emotions however
did not influence results. As in Experiment 1, the multivariate
MANOVA showed no statistically significant influence of the
induced final emotional state (F< 1.57, p= 0.22), nor interaction
with experimental group on the dependent variables (message
processing, compliance, information recall, F < 1).
Discussion
The findings replicate the emotional-seesaw effect demonstrated
in Experiment 1. The decrease in message processing and the
increase in compliance relative to the control group indicate that
a higher inclination toward persuasion that occurred apparently
because of shallower information processing. As in Experiment 1,
compliance with a nonsense request was the dominant response.
Experiment 2 furthermore provided evidence that the procedure
elicited the intended emotions. An interesting finding, however,
is that the emotions changed in the intended direction in the
control group, indicating a successful emotion induction, but
remained stable in the ESP groups. This could explain why the
direction of the emotional seesaw did not influence findings.
Afifi and Metts (1998) claim that an expectancy violation always
results in a cognitive arousal and an initiation of a series of
interpretations and evaluations that aid an individual in coping
with the unexpected outcome. Because the post affective measure
was assessed after the walk from one room to the other (not
immediately after the manipulation), we believe this to be a sign
that during the walk from one room to the other a cognitive
appraisal/interpretation took place that restored the affective
status quo.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Contrasting emotions lead to losses in processing efficacy,
leaving individuals momentarily vulnerable to social influence
attempts (Dolinski and Nawrat, 1998). We were able to
confirm these assumptions in a controlled laboratory setting.
Individuals subjected to an emotional seesaw did not only
display inhibited information processing, as indicated through
a lack of verbalizations in response to a senseless request, but
also displayed a higher tendency toward its fulfillment. By
demonstrating this, the current experiments provide a conceptual
replication of Dolinski and Nawrat’s (1998) earlier findings.
Our results extend the assumption that contrasting emotions
inhibit processing efficiency, showing its detrimental impact on
information recall. Finally, we were able to develop and validate
an easy to implement and properly counterbalanced procedure
to evoke contrasting emotions in a laboratory setting using
only a mild form of participant deception (i.e., information
omission). Given the clear success of the present replication
attempt, it is interesting to consider the possible reason why
people yield mindlessly to social influence after a sequence
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of changed emotions. So far it has been proffered that the
ESP evokes mindlessness. This supposition was confirmed in
various experiments. First people after an ESP have shown
processing deceleration when confronted with perceptual tasks
like arithmetical calculations, or emotion detection (Dolinski
et al., 2002). Second, Dolinski and Nawrat (1998) showed that
after a sequence of changed emotions people tend to accept even
dubious reasons when asked for money donation. We were able
to confirm this lack of critical cognitive dispute of information
when confronting people with a clearly senseless petition. This
processing inhibition was visible in the lack of comments and
concerns in response to senseless information.
One may argue that overt behavior does not necessarily
reflect participants’ current processing mode. However, the
debilitated information recall of petition associated information
clearly confirms our interpretation. It should be noted that
attention was not completely absent, but seemingly disengaged
from the ongoing scenario. Later, when asked to recall the
wording of the petition, participants were able to do so, but,
importantly, many reported to realize its meaning for the
first time. Apparently visual (aspects of petitionist) as well as
auditory (content of petition) components of the compliance
scenario were partially encoded by participants, but not mentally
integrated in working memory. This new finding shows that the
ESP does not completely impair the appraisal of a situation, only
the application of the information in the appraisal.
Dolinski et al. (2002) furthermore managed to show that
a mindless state of mind is crucial for compliance to take
place. In an experiment they forced emotionally seesawed
individuals back to mindfulness which resulted in a decrease
of compliance rates to control group levels (Dolinski et al.,
2002). Research has shown that people in a mindless processing
mode do not invest much thought into deciding how to respond
when presented with a request (Langer et al., 1978), rather
processing information automatically via mental shortcuts, also
called heuristics (Cialdini, 2001). In the present experiments,
participants’ tendency to comply with the request could
have been based on the heuristic that students typically
collect signatures for a good reason. Here, we have to point
out that we do not believe that contrasting emotions do
intrinsically increase compliance inclination by default, but
rather argue that they induce automatic processing, which
alters susceptibility to compliance only when compliance
promoting heuristic cues are available. Because we created
a compliance promoting context in our experiment (i.e., a
fellow student collecting signatures for probably a good reason),
the extent to which compliant responses were displayed by
participants could be elevated as compared to naturalistic
settings, where situational cues cannot be controlled to the same
extent.
So far, we were able to confirm that contrasting emotions
induce mindless processing, which leads to heuristic based
compliance. Furthermore these experiments were the first ones
to show the ESP’s detrimental impact on information recall. So
while there is a solid foundation of research on the ESP and
its consequences, the exact mindlessness evoking processes have
not been yet elucidated. Because no effects of the direction of
the affective shift, in former experiments (Nawrat and Dolinski,
2007) nor ours, on cognitive processing and behavior were found,
we argue that increased attention should be paid to other facets
of the ESP than the affective dynamic. We hypothesize that the
genesis of mindlessness after an ESP does not originate from the
affective shift, as so far hypothesized, but can be found in its
expectancy violating structure. We assert that each ESP involves
a situation that is believed to be true, and this supposition is
then abruptly proven inadequate. We propose that the attentional
focus on the ESP itself causes a decrease in available processing
capacity, which leads to less efficient cognitive processing,
congruently inhibiting the onset of mindfulness. Applying this
interpretation to our data, one can argue that people exposed to
discrepant information elicited by an unexpected payout scheme
paid more attention to the inconsistency and hence perceived
the subsequent petition scenario less accurately. Future research
should test these assumptions.
This experiment has a number of limitations. First, due to
the sensitivity of the ESP effect, the manipulation check to
corroborate the effectiveness of our emotion induction procedure
was included not directly after the manipulation, but after the
walk from one room to the other. Based on previous research
we know that the inclusion of a measure directly after the
ESP would actually undermine the success of the manipulation
designed to affect the dependent variables (Dolinski et al., 2002).
Second, due to the complexity of the design and its serial
approach (25 min per participant) sample size was kept fairly
small and the group of participants was quite homogenous
(mostly university students), limiting generalizability of findings
and impeding insight concerning possible moderating factors
such as age or education. Whereas the pattern of findings was
replicated across two experiments, a replication with a bigger and
more diverse sample is recommended. Nonetheless, the study
being conducted in a controlled lab environment also increases
its validity.
In closing, our research conceptually replicates findings
by Dolinski and Nawrat (1998) and Dolinski et al. (2002),
thus confirming that a display of contrasting emotions can
impact subsequent cognitive processing and consequently alter
susceptibility to persuasive attempts. We were able to not only
develop and validate a new ESP induction procedure suitable
for a laboratory setting, but also proposed a new possible
procedural view underlying the observed consequences. We
proffer that delineating the sequential change of emotions may
provide critical information on the psychological mechanism by
which emotional states affect cognitive processing and executive
processes. Within the present context, we hope that the newly
developed implementation procedure will guide and inspire
future research on contrasting emotions.
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